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The field of disinformation studies remains relatively silent about questions of identity,
motivation, labor, and morality. Drawing from a one-year ethnographic study of
disinformation producers employed in digital black ops campaigns in the Philippines, this
article proposes that approaches from production studies can address gaps in
disinformation research. We argue that approaching disinformation as a culture of
production opens inquiry into the social conditions that entice people to this work and the
creative industry practices that normalize fake news as a side gig. This article critically
reflects on the methodological risks and opportunities of ethnographic research that
subverts expectations of the exceptionally villainous troll and instead uses narratives of
creative workers’ complicity and collusion to advance holistic social critique and local-level
disinformation interventions.
Keywords: networked disinformation, fake news, trolls, production studies, digital labor,
political marketing, ethnography, complicity, Philippines

This article broadens the ambit of current inquiry about disinformation by putting it in dialogue with
production studies. Existing works in disinformation studies—along with journalistic exposes of “fake news
factories” (Silverman & Alexander, 2016) and their incisive profiles of racist and misogynist influencers of
the far right (Moore, 2016)—have brought to light the unanticipated scale of organized social media
manipulation around the world. Even to the most technopessimistic of analysts, the shocking revelations
about the toxic alchemy of technology and politics have come at a whiplash pace. From entrepreneurial
Macedonian teenagers peddling clickbait content to Trump supporters for easy money, to Cambridge
Analytica’s crafty servicing of psychographic hype and old-school blackmail techniques to political clients, to
the 9 million Russian troll tweets offered by Twitter as a “goldmine for researchers” (Burgess, 2018),
disinformation research currently has no shortage of insidious strategies of political influence to report.
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In the midst of all these revelations, recent work in disinformation studies has developed new
taxonomies aimed at critiquing digital disinformation across its different dimensions: as content, agents,
and technologies (Wardle & Derakshan, 2017). Scholars have also proposed new typologies differentiating
the variety of fake news (Tambini, 2017) and conducted meta-analysis of how “fake news” has been used
in academic scholarship (Tandoc, Lim, & Ling, 2017). Other disinformation studies have demystified the
persuasion strategies at the heart of the disinformation enterprise. Often beginning with a normative stance
of denunciation that assigns the role of villain to disinformation agents, their forensic objectives range from
enumerating the populist and/or posttruth rhetorical styles of hate-spewing politicians (Govil & Baishya,
2018) and paid trolls (Bulut & Yörük, 2017) to tracing their coordinative networking and message
dissemination strategies (Donovan & Friedberg, 2019; Marwick & Lewis, 2017). Also at the heart of such
disinformation studies lies the thrust to investigate the extent to which specific features of digital
technologies accelerate disinformation and threaten democratic deliberation. Hence, a wave of case studies
dedicated to the close study of individual platforms such as YouTube (Lewis, 2018) and discrete technologies
such as Twitter bots (Woolley & Guilbeault, 2017) has pondered individual platforms or technological
consequences for radicalization, polarization, and discrimination.
By drawing from the rich tradition of production studies and the cultural studies of media industries
(Banks, Conor, & Mayer, 2015; Grindstaff, 2009; Hesmondhalgh, 2007; Mayer, Banks, & Caldwell, 2009),
this article opens an expansive approach to examining disinformation as a culture of production. This means
conceptualizing disinformation as both product and process emerging from organizational structures, labor
relations, and entrepreneurial subjectivities.
One important value of approaching disinformation as a culture of production is that it exposes the
broader systems and cultures of practice that normalize and incentivize its everyday work arrangements.
To do this, we move away from the usual starting point of exposing or naming and shaming disinformation
producers as exceptional villains; instead, we begin by listening to them, and recording their intentions and
their experiences in their own words. Through this, we get to a closer understanding of why fake news
producers do this kind of work. We can identify the social conditions that have led them to their work, the
cultural scripts they use to justify their work to others and themselves, and, crucially, the opaque
institutional procedures that have allowed their work to flourish.
A second value of the production studies approach is that it underscores how disinformation is a
process of both collaboration and competition and an intentional product of hierarchized and distributed
labor. This insight helps disinformation studies propose new questions of ethics and accountability that
consider broader institutional relations at play. It raises concerns about how we assign responsibility to the
diversity of disinformation producers acting in various capacities as masterminds, complicit colleagues, or
low-level likers in what is essentially an open industry secret. It also pushes us to think of how we can
expand our notion of disinformation interventions from content regulation and platform banning of bad
actors and their harmful content to include process regulation of the ways political campaigns and
consultancies are conducted (see Ong, Tapsell, & Curato, 2019, p. 38). Recognition that fake news workers
can themselves be precarious digital workers prompts reflection of appropriate industry safety nets to
prevent (mostly young, millennial, aspiring-middle class) people from slipping into underground work.
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Here, we want to address how our move away from naming and shaming disinformation producers
toward understanding them within their situational and institutional contexts might be misconstrued as
reticence toward parrhesia, “the practice of frank and courageous speech delivered at the risk of angering
. . . a more powerful interlocutor“ (Roudakova, 2017, p. 38; see also Foucault, 2011). Our attention to
precarity and uncertainty in the distributed labor of fake news might be misunderstood as possibly deflecting
moral critique or, worse, playing into the hands of these savvy media manipulators. We want to clarify that
in taking a production studies approach that seeks to first listen to them, we do not absolve them from the
work that they have done. Rather, the goal is to understand them so that we can subsequently engage in a
nuanced reflection on complicated moral questions of “complicity and collusion” in our media participation
(Silverstone, 2007). By subverting expectations of people about who exactly paid trolls are and where they
come from, we critique the workings of the system at large and the different levels of responsibility at play.
We wish that this approach contributes to broader debates about the political value of representing
perpetrators’ narratives, which in media scholar Fernando Canet’s (2019) view can deepen “understand[ing
of] both the personal and situational dimensions that could lead a human being to commit such acts [and]
help us to determine how to prevent future cases” (p. 15).
As an empirical anchor for this article’s exploration of digital disinformation as a culture of
production, we draw from our research project that involved interviews and participant observation with the
actual authors of false news in Philippine political campaigns during and after the 2016 national elections.
This focus on the Philippines is significant because it has been at the forefront of contemporary innovations
in digital disinformation and, hence, often signals in advance what other democracies in the world could be
confronted with. The May 2016 elections in the country catapulted populist authoritarian Rodrigo Duterte to
the presidency after a savvy campaign that mixed the shock value of his profanity-laced speeches with the
firepower of vociferous social media influencers, bloggers, fan groups, and anonymous paid trolls amplifying
his message of anger against the elite establishment. Local and global media headlines were quick to reduce
Duterte’s triumph to what they assumed to be the exceptional innovation of his click army. An academic
study based on secondary surveys of news reports unfortunately replicated this misleading assertion and
inaccurately spotlighted Duterte’s party as the Philippines’ sole player in organized social media manipulation
(Bradshaw & Howard, 2017).
Moral panics commentaries on Filipino fake news often miss retelling the broader historical
narrative of the image-based patronage political system in the country that has normalized spin and “black
propaganda” negative campaigns orchestrated by branding strategists from the creative industries (Gloria,
Tabunada, & Fonbuena, 2004). Rather than an exceptional invention of angry populist politics or social
media, digital disinformation should be seen as but the current iteration of tried-and-tested techniques of
promotional marketing transposed into the political sphere. It is the culmination of the most unscrupulous
trends in Philippines media culture and politics, borne out of the country’s weak political party ideologies
and affiliations that are completely overwhelmed by political personalities building clientelistic relationships
with their supporters (Coronel, Chua, Rimban, & Cruz, 2004). At the same time, we acknowledge that their
vile and volatile consequences for the country’s democracy are also unprecedented, especially against the
current backdrop of a violent drug war, attack on democratic institutions, and muffling of opposition voices.
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Adopting the more expansive commitment of production studies to foreground producers’
subjectivities—“their similarities, their diversity, and their own internal contradictions” (Banks et al., 2015,
p. xi)—our study was able to reveal not only the broad reach of organized social media manipulation, but
also its deep entanglement with a professional hierarchy led by advertising and PR experts. We call these
arrangements the architecture of networked disinformation. We return to this concept in the latter half of
this article, where we flesh out its key characteristics and identify how political trolling has become an easy
sideline job in the booming creative economy.
Shared Agendas
In this section, we draw connections between the burning questions and interests of disinformation
studies with key principles and approaches advanced by production studies. The aim here is to show shared
agendas of the two areas of study, which can serve as generative starting points for future research.
It is important to note that disinformation research itself acknowledges the need for closer inquiry
into the “agents of information disorder.” Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakshan’s (2017) comprehensive
report outlines a broad research framework for the field. They highlight three “elements of information
disorder” along with accompanying key questions: (1) agents (Who are they and what motivates them?),
(2) messages (What format do they take?), and (3) interpreters (How do they make sense of the
messages?). Wardle and Derakshan introduce classification categories for the study of the three elements,
which taken together correspond with traditional distinctions in the “circuit of culture” consisting of
producers, texts, and audiences (du Gay et al., 1997). Their analytical categories pertaining to agents are
level of organization, type of motivation, level of automation, and intentions to mislead/harm specific
audiences (Wardle & Derakshan, 2017, p. 28).
Certainly, these suggestions build on the many gaps left by dominant social network and content
analysis approaches in disinformation research. Social network and content analyses theorize on agents’
intentions to mislead or harm out of digital forensics of their coordinative behaviors and their produced
messages (media content such as tweets, memes, etc.). When deployed effectively, these approaches
map out processes by which conversational frames, policy discourse, and mainstream media headlines
are hijacked by bad actors (e.g., Uyheng & Carley, 2019). Less effective approaches are those that
fetishize the effects of new technologies such as Twitter bots, without situating these within broader
campaign infrastructures or the social contexts of the agents that design them (e.g., Woolley &
Guilbeault, 2017).
An engagement with the anthropological spirit behind the above questions—Who exactly are
these agents and what motivates them?—demands that we understand the dynamics of how social
identities, class, and labor relations unfold within everyday moral economies of production. Here,
production studies can suggest new analytical categories: How do intersections of age, class, gender,
sexuality, and ethnicity affect agents’ recruitment or participation? What are the vertical and horizontal
relations of leadership, collaboration, and competition? What are the features of the local political
culture? How are diverse sectors of the creative economy involved? What is agents’ communicative
intent of using one medium over another to spread disinformation within an integrated “polymedia”
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(Madianou & Miller, 2012) communication infrastructure? Production studies would also demand greater
reflexivity about the research setting and the place of the researcher in relation to the field and the
diversity of agents s/he meets, epistemological and methodological concerns still absent from the core
disinformation research agenda.
In Mayer and colleagues’ (2009) introduction to the first volume of Production Studies, they
describe production studies as a field that takes
the lived realities of people involved in media production as the subjects for theorizing
production as culture . . . gather[ing] empirical data about . . . the complexity of routines
and rituals, the routines of seemingly complex processes, the economic and political forces
that shape roles, technologies, and the distribution of resources according to cultural and
demographic differences. (p. 4)
Attending to the “slippery social nature of labor practices” (p. 5) and juxtaposing them alongside official
statements, regulatory standards, and press coverage intend to disrupt popular assumptions around the
authorial intent and ingenuity of a visionary producer. Georgina Born (2008) conceptualizes media
production as the translation work of broad normative principles into institutional codes and then into diverse
media producers’ personal intentions. Applying this insight to the study of disinformation producers is a
worthwhile step back from the headline-grabbing politicians and influencers to whom we attribute fake or
hateful content, and a step closer to understanding their position and status in relation to the vast network
of paid political trolls and real supporters participating in the circulation of fake news.
The intention of a production studies approach would not at all be to displace normative judgment
about the democratically destructive effects of disinformation, but to get to the collisions and
convergences of economic incentives and vested interests that gave rise to this intentional object. By
recording the voices of invisible workers responsible for bad objects—from the casting agents of
(racist/classist) Jerry Springer (Grindstaff, 2009) to the cameramen of (misogynist) soft-core porn
(Mayer, 2008)—production studies mediate the knee-jerk demonization of individual characters, providing
instead a more holistic social critique.
Applied to the study of disinformation, production studies’ aim to link individual experience with
broader socioeconomic arrangements can be read alongside political ethnographies of populist publics and
the “rationalities” behind their support for Donald Trump in the United States (Hochschild, 2016), Narendra
Modi in India (Chakravartty & Roy, 2017), and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines (Arguelles, 2019; Curato,
2016). For Hochschild (2016), the roots of the populist upsurge in politics do not lie in economic distress as
much as they lie in a story about economic distress. Production studies and political ethnographies offer
disinformation studies a broader analytical frame beyond the study of an exceptional event of “alternative
facts” into the meticulous construction of mediated narratives at the heart of populist authoritarianism
(Cabañes, Anderson, & Ong, 2019; for a similar argument from within political communication, see Kreiss,
Barker, & Zenner, 2017). Recent disinformation studies apply some of these insights in emphasizing the
volatile collaborative work arrangements behind fake news (e.g., Starbird, Ahmer, & Wilson, 2019).
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Disinformation and Digital Production
Many principles of production studies have also informed a broad range of relevant research into
neoliberal precarious labor arrangements in digital gig economies. Interdisciplinary research in media studies
as well as sociology and anthropology elaborates on diverse factors that inhibit worker autonomy,
satisfaction, and political solidarity for IT workers in Australia (Gregg, 2011), digital influencers in Singapore
(Abidin, 2016), content moderators in the Philippines (Roberts, 2016), and click farm workers in Indonesia
(Lindquist, 2019). Provocatively, the sociologist Antonio Casilli (2016) argues that recent political outcomes,
particularly of Trump’s election and the global rise of fascism, are best understood in light of global digital
labor arrangements. As he puts it,
fascism, but coming in different shades, goes hand in hand with the oppression of digital
technology users, marginalized, forced into accepting only one centralized, normalized,
censored and exploited mode of platform governance . . . the structure of the current click
economy and global digital labor market helped Trump’s victory. Not algorithms. Nor fake
news. (blog post)
These studies have particularly inspired our curiosity to inquire into whether or not the
disinformation producers in our Philippines field site are inscribed in the same distributed labor, “race-tothe-bottom” arrangements as previous research on “digital sweatshops” in the Global South has described
(Graham et al., 2017).
Within disinformation studies, the insightful works of Joan Donovan and Brian Friedberg (2019),
Rebecca Lewis (2018), Alice Marwick (Marwick & Lewis, 2017), Whitney Phillips and Ryan Milner (Phillips,
2015; Phillips & Milner, 2017), and Matti Pohjonen and Sahana Udupa (Pohjonen & Udupa, 2017) make use
of ethnographically inspired approaches from their diverse backgrounds of social anthropology, folklore
studies, and within media research fan studies and science and technology studies to produce holistic and
grounded analyses of disinformation production.
Shared agendas with production studies are evident here and provide a useful roadmap for future
research. First is the sustained commitment to locate and contextualize bad objects within broader media
ecologies and institutional histories. For instance, Phillips (2015) traces how troll culture actually extends
from (the critique of) mainstream media culture, which challenges the simplifying and pathologizing
discourses of shock or exoticism that usually accompany popular coverage of fringe political actors in online
spaces. Meanwhile, Marwick and Lewis’s (2017) helpful concept of “attention-hacking” situates bad actors’
messaging and coordinative strategies alongside critique of “vulnerabilities” of mainstream media, as they
show how news media’s own predilection to hastily cover trending news items can be turned against them
if they are not careful.
Second is the anthropological commitment to attend to global difference and culture as important
grounds for critique and judgment. For instance, Pohjonen and Udupa (2017) reject tendencies in current
disinformation debates to apply from the top-down the legal frame of “hate speech” and its “assumptions
around politeness, civility, or abuse as universal features of communication with little cultural variation” (p.
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1174). As an intervention to binary classifications between hate speech and acceptable speech, they propose
that media and policy research draw from anthropological approaches that are sensitive to emic categories
and the “complex politics involved in labeling certain kinds of speech as one thing or another” (p. 1187).
Future projects on disinformation agents or producers have much to build on from reading previous
disinformation studies alongside production studies. In the next section, we expand in greater detail the
methodological choices we made in our research that attempt to apply production studies’ concern with
researchers’ reflexivity and dialectical analysis of systems and individuals.
Method
To demonstrate concretely how underexplored aspects of disinformation might be analyzed as part
of a broader analysis of the moral economies of digital media production, this section discusses the
methodological choices we made in our research project on the production of digital disinformation in the
Philippines. Our research was conducted in Manila from December 2016 to December 2017, in the aftermath
of the campaigns for the May 2016 Philippine national elections, which saw the intensification of online
political vitriol and the rise of controversial politician Rodrigo Duterte to the country’s presidency.
This was a politically volatile period with Duterte’s drug war registering casualties in the thousands,
key figures of the political opposition jailed, and critical journalists trolled and harassed, including with
arbitrary legal claims of “business violations” (Soriano, David, & Atun, 2019). It is clear that political trolling
is not confined to verbal abuse but can escalate to physical or even mortal harm. Many journalists and
academics responded by shaming Duterte supporters as brainwashed mobs, sluts, and cyber pests in online
discourse as well as through investigative reports aiming to “unmask the trolls” (Almario-Gonzalez, 2017),
thus creating a vicious cycle of hateful confrontation across political camps.
Thus, when we reached out to personal contacts we knew to have worked in political campaigns,
we made sure to carefully explain our main interest in digital labor, particularly in the procedures and
structures of digital political operations. Following the protocols of university research ethics, we emphasized
to them that we would disidentify information that could be traced to individuals. Conscious of the sensitive
nature of labels such as “troll” and “fake news” especially in our initial recruitment of participants, we only
used these words after respondents themselves used these terms in the course of an interview and only
after we had established rapport with them.
Finding respondents was a slow and tricky process. Searching for high-level strategists, we learned
early on that it was actually an open secret in the media and advertising and public relations circles who the
lead campaigners were. Given the country’s personality- rather than party-based political system, ad and
PR consultants have traditionally served central roles in branding political candidates. Thus, a number of
these high-profile strategists did not feel implicated in debates on fake news and happily boasted of their
services in interviews with local and global media (Jenkins, 2018). We met other strategists who kept to the
shadows but used the interviews with us to highlight their own savvy. Our positionality here as Filipino
academics in high-status positions as professors with degrees in foreign universities surely helped in
recruitment; we interpreted that many of the strategists sought status and credit not only from their peers
in the industry, but also from credentialed others whom they regarded as “experts.”
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From these initial interviews, we uncovered the hidden hierarchy of digital disinformation producers
as the ad and PR strategists introduced us to lower-level workers who assisted them in campaigns. These
people were cagier when it came to sharing details compared with the confident, financially well-off
strategists. Although some of them had already quit their political trolling jobs, a few found it difficult to
recount events, as if they had not spoken about the work they had done to anybody before. To gain their
trust, we emphasized our empathetic approach, reassuring them that our focus was understanding the
broader system of trolling rather than “exposing” individual workers or clients and their bad actions.
In total, we conducted 90- to 120-minute interviews with 20 disinformation producers. These included
six of those whom we call the “chief architects of networked disinformation,” the lead advertising and PR
experts in charge of the overall communication plan; five “anonymous digital influencers,” the aspirational
middle-class digital workers moonlighting as operators of anonymous accounts that command 50,000 or more
followers on Facebook and Twitter that do the important work of translating campaign strategies into the
popular vernaculars of pop culture references, snarky gay humor, or gutter language; and nine “communitylevel fake account operators,” the precarious middle-class digital workers tasked with sharing and amplifying
core campaign messages in the online communities and Facebook groups they had infiltrated.
To supplement these interviews, we also conducted participant observation of more than 20 publicly
accessible Facebook groups and pages and Twitter accounts supporting various political camps—including
those that were explicitly pro- and anti-Duterte—as well as those that had no explicit representation of
candidates or political parties, but who claimed to curate “social media news.” This allowed us to understand
how networked disinformation campaigns were translated into specific posts or memes. During our
fieldwork, some participants showed us fake accounts they operated and even shared their passwords to
these accounts. This provided us an added opportunity to compare and contrast what our participants said
in the context of the interview with what they actually did in the online profiles they created, as we were
able to check on the digital traces they left in their Facebook histories. In academic writings as well as our
own interviews with curious journalists about our work, we are conscious not to disclose usernames or
handles, following anonymization protocols for “risky research.”
Networked Disinformation as a Digital Project
Earlier in this article, we introduced the concept of “networked disinformation” to describe the primary
model of disinformation production in Philippine political campaigns. This concept foregrounds the hierarchical
but distributed labor of loosely organized campaign operators. In this section, we explain the two key features
of a networked disinformation project by drawing on the experiences of workers at various positions in this
professional hierarchy. As we pointed out earlier, these workers include the chief disinformation architects, the
anonymous digital influencers, and the community-level fake account operators.
The first key feature of networked disinformation that we want to highlight is how it is rooted in
general principles in advertising and public relations. We discovered in our project that networked
disinformation for Filipino politicians was a hyperextension of corporate marketing practices, in which
techniques of “attention-hacking” (Marwick & Lewis, 2017) were first tested out in advertising and PR
campaigns for shampoo or soft drink brands and then transposed to political marketing. Both campaign
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principles and work structures followed models first developed in advertising and PR, and they were applied
to campaigns for politicians across the political spectrum.
Grace (44 years old), one of the more cutting-edge digital PR strategists in the disinformation
industry, for example, explained that she first developed Twitter disinformation techniques while handling
the accounts for a high-profile telecom brand and international celebrity events. During this time, she
perfected the craft of recruiting several Twitter influencers who would execute her two-pronged plan. One
involved “trending,” which meant organizing influencers to boost the same hashtag through diverse witty,
snarky, and pop culture-savvy posts that aimed to draw the attention of journalists as well as the general
public. The other technique involved what we call “signal scrambling,” which involved the same influencers
torpedoing their opposing campaign’s hashtags by dividing support for these through similar-looking but
syntactically different decoy hashtags. Grace said that she had recently ventured to doing more political
consultancies in the 2016 elections as she needed a challenge different from her typical gigs with corporate
brands. She insisted that with the creativity and talent of social media influencers in the Philippines, the
country was actually “sitting on a stockpile of digital weapons.”
Certainly, digital influencers themselves saw the financial opportunities in disinformation operations
but justified that these were natural extensions of doing native advertising for corporate brands. Most of
the digital influencers operated between three to six accounts of various personas—from “positive”
inspirational meme pages to pseudonymous pop culture characters with bitchy personas—that variably
translated the same communication objective into diverse expressions that appeared “organic” or “onbrand” to the particular social media profiles they maintained. Thirty-year-old Dessa told us, however, that
she had to construct from scratch the bitchy accounts that used snarky gay humor for political clients: “For
corporate brands, we need to stick with more positive messaging. Political clients don’t have brand bibles
though and so it’s normal for us to go on attack mode against their opponents.”
The second key feature of networked disinformation is its project-based nature, where workers
were employed on short-term contracts with their clients who measured the delivery of outputs along
specific criteria and metrics. These were often taken on as sideline work, as people maintained their day
jobs in advertising, online marketing, or serving as politicians’ administrative staff. As distributed labor,
different workers were enlisted to achieve discrete objectives while only having loose and informal
connections with their fellow workers. Often disinformation workers did not share the same office and were
not always clear how certain campaigns fit within overall objectives of political clients.
Illustrative of this project-based nature of networked disinformation was a campaign aimed at
shifting public sentiment about one of the Philippines’ most prominent political clans using historical
revisionist narratives. In the course of talking to different strategists, we learned that although there was a
singular campaign objective that unified this campaign, the disinformation producers involved in it were
working in completely separate teams. Although these teams were working on different elements of the
campaign, they all tried to top each other in the aim of impressing their common client. Gloria (48 years
old), one of the lead PR experts in this campaign, was extremely proud of the documentary-like YouTube
series that she and her team had produced. She explained that what made these videos effective was that
they were not outright lies, but that they were based on “truths, but slightly fudged.”
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Meanwhile, digital influencers needed to be competitive with their fellow influencers even when
working on the same team and reporting to the same lead PR strategist. Influencers were compensated
based on a competitive matrix of reach and engagement that meant that those whose posts went viral were
rewarded with higher pay and other bonus rewards such as the latest iPhone model or a meet-and-greet
with a top-level celebrity. Influencers with existing relationships with the PR strategists were familiar with
these pay arrangements as they often follow the same model as their corporate marketing gigs. But unlike
corporate gigs in which brands have more of a say about both tone and content, influencers used toilet
humor or gutter language for a political campaign as politicians did not sign off on campaign executions or
review postcampaign reports.
In the next two sections, we underscore two problematic implications of networked disinformation.
One is that it pushes producers to compete and outdo each other to craft messages with the greatest
potential for attention-hacking. Second is that it also allows disinformation producers to invoke moral
justifications that minimize the pernicious impact of their work.
Competitive Collegialities Lead to Volatile Virality
As we indicated above, the distributed labor structure of disinformation projects led the workers
within and across teams engaged in a constant one-upmanship. This meant that although campaigns were
designed at the top with a certain objective, distributing the execution of this objective among workers led
to unpredictable consequences.
Lead strategists required the promotional labor of digital influencers who were more fluent with
popular vernaculars and were able to weaponize these into effective social media posts that mobilized public
sentiments of anger and resentment. Conversely, influencers and fake account operators also needed the chief
strategists to broker projects for them. The strategists did the crucial work of interfacing with clients who did
not necessarily wish to know all the lurid details behind the viral hashtag campaigns they paid for. In effect,
strategists legitimized disinformation projects for both their clients and their team of digital workers.
During the course of our fieldwork, we came to a gradual understanding of how strategists used
euphemisms for “fake news” and “trolling,” drawing from industry jargon as ways to neutralize stigma not
only when they spoke to us as researchers, but also when they pitched their services to political clients. For
example, in our interview with the 29-year-old digital strategist Aisa, she proudly claimed that her firm
never used “fake news” in promoting a mayoral candidate, but mentioned instead how they relied on
“supplemental accounts” to amplify posts from that mayor’s official Facebook page. From our digital
ethnography, we compared what she said with what their firm actually did and discovered how those
“supplemental accounts” were Facebook pages that claimed to curate independent local news but were
insidiously seeding manipulative memes promoting their mayoral candidate. Another strategist, Grace,
meanwhile used the term “digital support worker” in interviews. We figured out over time that this was a
PR industry term Grace used as a catchall when she justified her staff budget of fake account operators to
her political clients.
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On some occasions, campaigns led to online discussions with greater vitriol than strategists
intended. As influencers were incentivized by strategists along a competitive matrix of reach and
engagement, some ended up producing offensive content that was not agreed on at the beginning. For
instance, one particularly racist meme that attempted to humiliate a politician for having dark skin went
viral as it tapped into deep-seated postcolonial racial hierarchies in the Philippines (see Cabañes, 2014).
The strategist we met explained that although the team did plan a coordinated attack, she said that she
was frustrated how her team of influencers had “gone too far.” We interpreted the strategist’s frustration
as less rooted in moral indignation around racism and more about how the attack almost backfired and
created an underdog and victim position for their rival.
Again, the major consequence of competitive collegialities was the displacement of responsibility
for the outcomes of networked disinformation. Most workers in the disinformation architecture were focused
on staying ahead (for the strategists) or, more desperately, getting ahead (for the influencers and the fake
account operators). As such, no one wanted to address or assume accountability for the misogyny and
racism, among other things, that emerged in the aftermath of networked disinformation activities. None of
them was interested in self-regulation.
Entrepreneurial Trolls’ Moral Justifications
The second consequence of the architecture of networked disinformation was that it enabled the
disinformation producers to invoke moral justifications that not only minimized the pernicious impact of their
work, but that also displaced it too. Here, we begin with the chief disinformation architects at the top of the
hierarchy. During our fieldwork, we met 40-year-old Dom, who we heard from key informants in the
advertising and PR industry has a long record of handling high-profile candidates including presidential
aspirants. We learned during our interview that she is known by her peers as a seasoned creative director,
particularly for her skill with coming up with clever corporate taglines. Speaking to us in her luxury
apartment in Manila’s business district, she described her work as a political consultant as a more thrilling
and challenging version of her everyday work handling corporate brands.
It is evident that strategists like Dom relished the thrill and adrenaline rush they got from their
risky projects. She told us,
Maybe if I had this power 10 years ago, I would have abused it and I could toy with you
guys. But now I’m in my 40s, it’s a good thing I have a little maturity on how to use it. But
what I’m really saying is we can f*ck your digital life without you even knowing about it.
Moments like these in our fieldwork reminded us of the power these high-status and well-connected
strategists wielded over us as researchers, but also over the hapless folks in the industry who might have
crossed this woman.
At the same time, however, strategists like Dom expressed discourses of gamification and
fictionalization to justify their work. They drew from cultural scripts from Western entertainment to
fictionalize the dangerous consequences of their actions and block feelings of real involvement. For example,
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the PR strategist Grace compared herself with the popular Game of Thrones character Olenna Tyrell, who
invisibly orchestrated the death of a king in the hit HBO show: “Other people like taking credit for trendingthis, campaign-that. But not with me. I like working from the shadows, you know, like Olenna Tyrell. Nobody
needs to know it was me!” This suggested to us too that some ad and PR strategists managed personal
strategies of evading accountability and psychological distance from the disinformation materials actually
produced. Ad and PR strategists saw themselves as taking on the more professional work of crafting
campaign objectives and messages when compared with the digital influencers who had to do the dirty work
of translating their objectives and messages into actual social media content.
Ad and PR strategists also explained that digital operations were an opportunity to disrupt
existing social hierarchies and challenge established power players in political campaigning. As 28-yearold Rachel shared,
I’d actually like to phase out our company practice of paying out journalists to seed or delete
news because they can be entitled or unscrupulous. The reason why I’m more passionate
and committed about online work is because I don’t like the politics in journalism.
In this quote, it is interesting how their cynicism about mainstream media is used as a moral justification to
dispose of institutionalized practice by replacing it with another version equally lacking in scruples yet
ultimately benefiting themselves. By expressing statements that exaggerate evil or corruption in existing
public institutions, these ambitious workers imagined themselves as agents that could even bring about
innovation without accepting moral responsibility for their own actions (for a related analysis of cynicism in
media practice, see Roudakova, 2017, chapter 4).
Meanwhile, for the anonymous digital influencers we met, the casual and short-term nature of
disinformation projects meant that they could downplay their involvement in it. Because the work was just
one sideline gig they juggled with others, they could tell themselves that fake news did not define their
whole identity. For example, we met 28-year-old transgender Georgina who operated by herself six
anonymous accounts and worked with her other transgender friends for corporate and political marketing
projects that needed signal boosting on Twitter.
She explained, “Being a character or a ‘pseudo’ is only very fleeting because you are not the person.
You just assume that personality. You trend for a while and then move on.” We found out that Georgina’s
day job was in search engine optimization, helping clients improve their Google page rank. An early adopter
of new technology, she claimed she had always been fascinated by new financial opportunities offered by
digital platforms. When she grew in her understanding of the influencer industry a few years ago, she
created a meme account and steadily grew its followers seeking daily inspiration from its feed of feel-good
positivity quotes. Eventually, she was hired to promote campaigns for local telcos, then celebrities and their
movies, then political clients.
As part of the aspirational middle class, anonymous digital influencers were driven by financial
motivations in their disinformation work. They previously endured less stable jobs in the creative and digital
industries and see influencer work as giving them more freedom, including when choosing clients. We found
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out that disinformation projects occasionally meant being in an aspirational work environment. The
influencers we met recalled with pride how they did campaigns while booked overnight in a five-star hotel
suite or in a mansion in a gated village.
At the bottom level, community-level fake account operators cited primarily financial motivations
for engaging in this kind of work—extra work for extra cash. Most of the respondents in our study were (a)
fake account operators working within politicians’ own administrative staff. These were usually junior-level
employees tasked to “help” with a political campaign, and they usually begrudged the fact that there was
no additional pay for this kind of publicly derided work they did not sign up for. Other fake account operators
were (b) freelancers paid on a per-day basis on achieving a set number of posts or comments and (c) officebased fake account operators who worked in a call center kind of arrangement, some of whom operated in
provinces that were bailiwicks of politicians.
Many fake account operators appeared to be workers who had previously tried out other risky
enterprises as a means to achieve financial stability. Although in many cases fake account operators colluded
with people who offered financial rewards in exchange for accomplishing morally sketchy tasks, we also
heard stories of subtle forms of resistance from within a disinformation project.
For instance, in 26-year-old law student Risa’s case, we found an example of a reluctant worker
who resisted and very likely sabotaged the fake account operations work she was compelled to do. Reporting
to a very domineering, take-no-prisoners chief of staff of a fledgling mayoral candidate in one of the largest
cities in Metro Manila, Risa and her cohort of fresh college graduates could not but agree to do the shameful
work of creating fake accounts and trolling Facebook community pages. What was worse was that this was
additional work, without additional pay. In election season after all, taking on additional work showed
pakikisama [getting along with others] and utang na loob [fulfilling debt obligations], especially for young
people fresh out of college.
Following the example of the chief of staff who maintained two fake accounts herself, Risa and her
colleagues were tasked to come up with fake profiles and populate a Facebook group dedicated to the city
they were trying to win. Although Risa did not admit it during her interview, it seemed to us quite probable
that she intentionally sabotaged her own fake account. She told us she had only become Facebook friends
with 20 people, unlike her other colleagues who maintained “bikini troll” accounts that lured 500 new friends
with overtly sexual profile pictures. Unlike her colleagues, Risa never spoke about the “thrill” of creating
viral memes. The discomfort was evident in her body language during the interview: Her narration was slow
and stilted, as if the words brought her physical pain the moment they left her body.
Risa’s case, along with other disinformation producers’ experiences, suggested to us the ease of
corruptibility within established systems of corporate marketing, digital influencer work, and political
administration. Disinformation production has become an add-on to a portfolio of marketing services,
particularly in the absence of any self-regulation mechanisms for political consultancies and digital
advertising. In the Philippines, there are no existing frameworks promoting transparency in political
consultancies and digital PR. The creative industries have self-regulatory bodies to monitor corporate brand
claims and promises, but there has yet to be any systematic tracking or monitoring of marketing firms that
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take in political clients. In the concluding section, we offer reflection on the opportunities as well as risks
that production studies have to offer for disinformation studies.
Trade-offs of a Production Studies Approach to Digital Disinformation
By exploring disinformation workers’ social identities and moral justifications, this article has
offered insight into how fake news is not just a matter of political leadership, angry populist fervor, or
technological innovation, but also an issue of political economy. Political trolling has become a lucrative
sideline that is widely available for entrepreneurial workers within in a country at the forefront of both the
high-status creative digital economy and its underbelly of low-status outsourced jobs from call center work
(Graham et al., 2017) to commercial content moderation (Roberts, 2016). This expanding industry thrives
in “structures of disprivilege” (Udupa, 2019) that impels a large number of social media entrepreneurs to
cater to the demands of the digital underground. Our description of an advertising and PR work model of
“networked disinformation” has more similarity to large democracies with strong personalistic political
systems such as India, a country where advertising and PR executives also moonlight as political consultants
for maximum profit and little political accountability (Udupa, 2019). But they can broadly apply to Western
liberal democracies with image-based political cultures, relying on image consultants from the PR industry
in which “disinformation is in the DNA” (Edwards, 2019 [blog]). Our descriptions of precarious digital labor
are also relevant to understanding the work contexts of Russian troll workers and Chinese 50-cent army
workers, although our account emphasizes a more creative and networked aspect to disinformation
production that is not centrally commanded.
A production studies approach thus sheds light into how digital disinformation is not an all-new
Duterte novelty; it is in fact the culmination of the most unscrupulous trends in the country’s media and
political culture. Many of the techniques of disinformation were first tried and tested in marketing shampoos
and soft drinks before extending them to marketing politicians and their narratives. The difference is that
seeded hashtags that aim to drown out dissent pose greater dangers to political futures.
In conclusion, we find it important to acknowledge the conceptual as well as political trade-offs in
taking a production studies approach to digital disinformation. We only hope that our study as well as our
policy lobbying efforts alongside civil society watchdogs in the Philippines complement, rather than replace,
other interventions such as journalists’ reporting and civil society lobbying for more investment in platforms’
content moderation of hate speech.
The first trade-off of a production studies approach is that instead of naming and shaming highprofile personalities, it maps out the broader system and incentive structures to fake news production. For
us, this offers a corrective to current initiatives dedicated to fact-checking fake news. As Whitney Phillips
(2018) warns, some fact-checking efforts potentially popularize, or “oxidize,” bad content by playing into
the very intentions of media manipulators to influence the mainstream media agenda. By focusing on
structures rather than individuals, we cut short the news cycles of attention hackers’ shocking headlines
and focus on foundational ethical flaws in political marketing and digital influencer practices. A less
personality-oriented approach also enables us to capture the micro-level influence operations at work
instead of just the easy targets.
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The second trade-off is that instead of mobilizing a heroes-and-villains frame when talking about fake
news, we reflect on everyone’s “complicity and collusion” in its practice (Silverstone, 2007). Although our
production studies approach means we are unable to serve in the frontlines along with Filipino journalists directly
speaking “truth to power” against Duterte’s violent regime, we can instead call out the broader network of
disinformation architects serving less controversial politicians that use the same disinformation tactics but
escape the glare of observers. Journalists themselves have also been unable to hold accountable the advertising
and PR strategists behind digital disinformation campaigns as these powerful individuals control the corporate
advertising money that their news agencies greatly depend on. In this light, we see our work as also speaking
“truth to power” to those in high positions of economic power in the creative industries who consider themselves
“kingmakers” in the political realm. Our ethnographic descriptions of various workers’ complicity and collusion
in disinformation production challenge us to move beyond partisanship in fake news moral panics discourse and
call out politicians and workers complicit in this practice wherever they may fall in the political spectrum. We
argue that journalists who tend to overemphasize “fake news” as merely a Duterte phenomenon or a recent
case of state-sponsored propaganda run the risk of enabling the entrenchment of amoral disinformation
architects in the political system. This simply allows disinformation architects to slip undetected, engineer more
innovations, and ally with new political patrons that offer them power and protection for the next election cycle.
Finally, the third trade-off of a production studies approach is that instead of focusing policy
lobbying efforts at global-level content regulation by the tech platforms, we highlight local-level process
regulation aiming for transparency in the context of political campaigns and influencer marketing. We
observe worrying trends of content regulation in neighboring Southeast Asian countries where “anti-fake
news laws” have been weaponized by government to censor dissenting voices and silence the opposition in
social media (George, 2019). A production studies approach would mean rejecting illiberal responses of
censorship for process-oriented responses that aim for transparency and accountability in the conduct of
political consultancies, election campaigning, and influencer marketing.
Our ethnographic approach begins with an imperative for empathy to understand the conditions
that push people to engage in precarious disinformation work, but this does not mean we absolve these
workers of their lack of ethics and accountability. In fact, we assign greatest responsibility here on the toplevel advertising and PR strategists and their political clients who benefit the most from the architecture of
networked disinformation.
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